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Transfer of Employment Practices, Varieties of Capitalism, 
and National Employment Systems. A Review** 
Abstract – National employment systems are changing primarily through the activities of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). In order to understand in how far national employment 
systems are susceptible to change, we revisit important quantitative empirical studies published 
since 1994 on the transfer of employment practices within MNEs. Three propositions are 
derived from a neo-institutional approach, and evidence for all of the three was found when 
re-analysing the empirical papers. Firstly, human resource practices are more often transferred 
than industrial relations practices. Secondly, HR practices are more often transferred from a 
liberal market economy (such as the USA) to a coordinated market economy (such as Ger-
many) than vice versa. Thirdly, some adoption of HR practices common in the USA points to 
a dominance effect. Overall, the findings show that an uneven change in national employment 
systems is to be expected from the transfer of practices within MNEs. The limits of the analy-
sis and further routes for research are discussed in the concluding section of the paper. 
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Beschäftigungssysteme: Ein Überblick 
Zusammenfassung – Nationale Beschäftigungssysteme verändern sich vor allem aufgrund 
der Aktivitäten multinationaler Unternehmen. In diesem Beitrag wird die Veränderungsanfäl-
ligkeit nationaler Beschäftigungssysteme untersucht, indem seit 1994 veröffentlichte, wichtige 
empirische Studien zum Transfer von Personalpraktiken innerhalb multinationaler Unterneh-
men aufgearbeitet werden. Drei Zusammenhänge, die aus neo-institutionalistischer Perspektive 
motiviert werden, bestätigen sich in den Studien. Erstens werden Praktiken der Arbeitsbezie-
hungen seltener transferiert als andere Personalpraktiken („HR-Praktiken“). Zweitens werden 
HR-Praktiken häufiger aus einer liberalen Marktökonomie in eine koordinierte Marktökonomie 
transferiert als in umgekehrter Richtung. Drittens weist die Einführung bestimmter “angel-
sächsischer” HR-Praktiken auf einen Dominanzeffekt hin. Insgesamt zeigen die Befunde, dass 
sich nationale Beschäftigungssysteme in Reaktion auf die Entscheidungen multinationaler 
Unternehmen asymmetrisch verändern. Der Beitrag benennt abschließend bestimmte Grenzen 
der vorliegenden Analyse und wirft interessante künftige Forschungsfragen auf. 
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1. Introduction 
Companies differ systematically across nations in their employment practices, for 
example in terms of worker supervision (Gordon 1994), job descriptions (Marsden 
1999, 2000), job authority (Dobbin/Boychuk 1999), and the importance of organiza-
tion versus market control (Hendry 2003). It is therefore legitimate to speak of a “na-
tional employment system” (Dobbin/Boychuk 1999) as a combination of employ-
ment practices that are typical for and widespread in a certain country and that differs 
from the systems in other countries. National employment systems are shaped by the 
wider institutional context – the variety of capitalism into which they are embedded 
(Hall/Soskice 2001). They differ, for example, because trade unions or works councils 
may be endowed with different degrees of power, and because the national system of 
education and training equips workers with different levels and types of skills. 
Though national employment systems – in principle – tend to persist, they have 
changed considerably since the 1990s, leading to more divergent systems (Katz/ 
Darbishire 2000). Japan and Germany are cases in point. They have long been consid-
ered as prime examples of a welfare capitalism with stable non-market institutions 
(Dore 2000). But in Japan, the traditional system of life-long employment and seniori-
ty-based pay has been transformed (Watanabe 2000), and in Germany, the strongly 
collectivist employment system has undergone a substantial revision (Bosch et al. 
2007; Hassel 1999).  
The chief impetus for change comes from the activities of multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) in an internationally competitive environment (Morgan/Kristensen 
2006). MNEs often apply employment practices within their jurisdiction that are at 
odds with local practice. This is because MNEs often transfer practices from the 
home country to different host countries, or they implement a global employment 
system by centralizing perceived best practices. In addition to the direct changes that 
MNEs thus bring to their host countries, indirect changes are induced by processes 
that lead – from a neo-institutional perspective – to isomorphism (DiMaggio/Powell 
1983). The introduction by MNEs of new modes of employment systems challenges 
the legitimacy of existing patterns within host countries (Kwok/Tadesse 2006; 
Westney 1993). In the face of increased international competition, managers of local 
organizations also look towards MNEs because their policies are often considered as 
best practices. (Tayeb 1999). Emulating these will bestow local organizations with 
legitimacy and trustworthiness, which in turn helps to attract global investors and 
highly qualified employees. Processes of normative isomorphism are also at work: 
practices employed by MNEs often diffuse via business schools, consulting compa-
nies, and professional associations (Tempel/Walgenbach 2007). Overall, the transfer 
of practices changes national employment systems in a number of direct and indirect 
ways. 
In this paper, we shed light on the changes from a particular comparative per-
spective. We study which countries, and which employment practices, are most sus-
ceptible to change via a transfer. The literature on employment systems has not ad-
dressed this issue. Conceptual approaches have concentrated on developing typologies 
capturing differences in employment systems that are not identical with national sys-
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tems (Hendry 2003; Marsden 1999, 2000). The few comparative accounts of employ-
ment systems have emphasized the differences across countries rather than changes 
within the country systems (Dobbin/Boychuk 1999). 
We approach our question in this paper by revisiting the literature on the transfer 
of employment practices within MNEs. The stream of studies published since the 
seminal article by Rosenzweig/Nohria (1994) has important implications for change in 
national employment systems. It is linked in this paper to insights on national institu-
tional contexts. Linking institutionalism to the study of the transfer of employment 
practices has been suggested elsewhere (Edwards et al. 2006; Farndale et al. 2008; 
Ferner et al. 2005; Ferner/Tempel 2006; Tempel/Walgenbach 2007) and underlies 
many of the empirical papers we review below. Building on institutional theory, our 
review is more theoretical than previous ones (Almond et al. 2003; Edwards/Ferner 
2002; for example, Ferner 1997).  
We make two main points in this review paper. Firstly, a meaningful distinction 
can be made between employment systems within coordinated market economies and 
within liberal market economies. Among these, the employment systems in coordinat-
ed market economies are more susceptible to change via the transfer of employment 
practices. The dichotomy is helpful in predicting change. Most studies, when referring 
to national institutions, have resorted to the concept “national business systems”, 
thereby emphasizing the uniqueness of each country system rather than following a 
typology approach. The dichotomy, however, allows classifying countries in a way that 
can predict the extent of transfer (Farndale et al. 2008; Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2008; 
Parry et al. 2008). Secondly, human resource (HR) practices are more easily, and more 
often, transferred than industrial relations (IR) practices. This has been argued by 
Schmitt/Sadowski (2003) and it is a common pattern emerging from a systematic 
review of all quantitative studies. Therefore, national employment systems may change 
unevenly, with IR practices persisting while HR practices are more likely to change. 
The two points are derived in the second section of the paper. The third section 
presents evidence from revisiting 14 journal articles, which examined empirically the 
transfer of employment practices based on large-n studies. Though the two main 
points we suggest are supported, the literature illustrates the substantial gaps that re-
main. In particular, the evidence has been based on too few datasets and too few 
countries. Furthermore, the transfer of practices has been measured in manifold ways, 
thus inhibiting easy generalization across studies. These limitations along with routes 
for future research are discussed in the concluding section. 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1 Building blocks 
The managements of MNEs seek to transfer employment practices across borders for 
two main reasons. They may either apply the methods they are accustomed to in their 
home country, or they may try to implement practices globally because these work 
well or facilitate coordination within the MNE or both. If a transfer is successful, the 
local practice is changed, contributing to a change in the national employment system. 
If the attempted transfer is not successful, local adaptation prevails and the national 
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employment remains unchanged. Our analysis of existing studies in terms of transfer 
versus local adaption is guided by four arguments or building blocks. 
First, it is argued that a useful distinction can be drawn between two orientations of national 
employment systems that mirror the two ideal types of capitalism suggested by Hall/Soskice (2001). 
In their analysis, and related ones in the “comparative capitalism” literature (Jack-
son/Deeg 2008), country-specific institutional environments are depicted as configu-
rations of interdependent institutions (Haake 2002; Hall/Soskice 2001; Whitley 1999,  
2007). These institutions refer to education and training, the financial system, inter-
firm relations as well as labour market regulation and industrial relations. The main 
proposition is that economies tend to gravitate to either of two successful ideal types 
of capitalism: the liberal market economies type exemplified by the USA and a coor-
dinated market economies type exemplified by Germany. The literature on national 
employment systems, we argue, is consistent with the dichotomy of capitalist models 
and provides important details on how the different types of capitalism work on the 
shop-floor, so to speak. This idea can be illustrated with reference to the work of 
Marsden (1999; 2000) and Hendry (2000; 2003). 
Hendry, in his typology of employment systems, distinguishes “market control” 
from “organization control”. Market control involves a lot of hiring and firing and 
adjustments of terms according to market situation. Organization control, by contrast, 
insulates employees partly from those external market forces by seeking to retain and 
develop employees. Though Hendry does not discuss national differences, it is clear 
that the market type of control is more compatible with a liberal market economy, in 
which exchanges on labour and other markets tend to be organized by short-term, 
arms-length relationships. The institutional setup supports this type of strategy, for 
example, with lax employment protection legislation. Conversely, the organization 
type of control is compatible with a coordinated market economy, in which firms are 
embedded into intermediary institutions that encourage more long-term and implicit 
contractual arrangements. The institutional setup supports this organization control, 
for example, by an institutionalized system of vocational training and strict employ-
ment protection legislation. 
Similarly, Marsden distinguishes between a “task-centred” and a “function-
centred” approach to classifying jobs. The function-centred approach defines jobs by 
relying on the qualification that employees hold. This implies that job content, in 
terms of the actual tasks performed, remains somewhat flexible. For firms to be able 
to follow this approach, a system of vocational education and training, as it is com-
mon in many coordinated market economies, must be in place. Marsden’s prime 
country example for the function-centred approach is, accordingly, Germany. Con-
versely, the task-centred approach defines jobs more rigidly depending on the proce-
dure in the chain of production or on the tools of the trade. That approach is more 
compatible with liberal market economies, in which shop-floor workers often lack 
broader skills and a strong vertical division of labour between conception and execu-
tion is in place. Marsden’s prime example is the USA. 
Overall, then, liberal market economies favour company-level employment sys-
tems involving market control and task-centred job descriptions. Conversely, coordi-
nated market economies favour company-level employment systems involving organi-
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zation control and function-centred job descriptions. These differences would imply 
substantial differences also in the whole range of employment practices such as train-
ing, pay determination, and hiring and firing. 
As a second building block, it is argued that societal norms complement regulatory norms in dif-
ferent types of capitalism, and these norms in turn influence whether cross-border transfer or local 
adaption is observed. Different types of norms are distinguished in the neo-institutional 
approach (DiMaggio/Powell 1983; Meyer/Rowan 1977). That approach complements 
the varieties-of-capitalism in understanding the transfer of employment practices 
(Tempel/Walgenbach 2007). In addition to the formal regulation discussed by 
Hall/Soskice, societal norms also form an integral part of national institutions. In 
particular, “regulatory institutions” such as works councils or other voice institutions 
are often connected with a strong, widespread expectation that individual employers 
comply to common practice. In other words, the regulatory institutions are comple-
mented by “normative institutions”. According to neo-institutional arguments, then, 
these normative institutions exert a strong pressure on MNEs to meet expectations 
and adopt the practices established in the host country. Overall, varieties of capitalism 
refer both to regulatory institutions and societal norms, both to the political economy 
and the “moral economy” (Granovetter 2002; Thompson 1971) 
As a third building block, it is argued that societal norms do not attach in the same way to dif-
ferent employment practices. A rough distinction should be made in that respect between 
industrial relations (IR) practices and human resource (HR) practices (Schmitt/ 
Sadowski 2003). IR practices refer to whether an employer recognizes trade unions 
and works councils; HR practices denote the whole range of other employment prac-
tices such as recruitment or training. IR and HR practices differ in two ways relevant 
for this analysis. Compared to HR practices, IR practices are more severely influenced 
by coercive isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism refers to both formal regulations 
and societal norms (DiMaggio/Powell 1983). In contrast to HR practices, IR practices 
are more strictly regulated by law. Additionally, IR practices are supported, in particu-
lar in coordinated market economies, by the moral economy, by strong norms for 
MNEs to comply with local practice (coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism). 
For HR practices, such norms are weaker or even absent. A second difference be-
tween IR and HR practices refers to their costs or burdens on employers. Voice 
mechanisms grant workers more power by providing them with information and by 
establishing roads for bargaining. This may raise labour costs. Furthermore, negotia-
tions themselves incur costs and may protract the decision-making process. Though 
there has been a long-lasting debate on whether voice mechanism may enhance 
productivity through reducing labour turnover and conflict at a social level, it is safe to 
argue that, from an individual employer’s viewpoint, voice mechanisms are costly 
(Freeman/Lazear 1995). 
As a fourth and final building block, it is argued that certain norms may exist inducing the 
management of MNEs to adopt employment practices typical for US companies (Ferner/Quintanilla 
1998). These norms arise because practices originating from the USA acquire the sta-
tus of best practice, or of a common currency within global business. This is because 
US American (and British) companies have been the most important MNEs investing 
abroad and the USA has been perceived as the dominant economy. If US MNEs 
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therefore tend to be referred to as the sources of best practices, then companies in 
other institutional environments may adopt employment practices common in US 
MNEs; this type of adoption can be interpreted as mimetic isomorphism (DiMag-
gio/Powell 1983). Then, adoption of practices is not necessarily a transfer of practices 
from home to host country but may still lead to change in national employment sys-
tems. 
2.2 Propositions 
The four building blocks give rise to three main propositions, which are going to 
guide our re-analysis of existing empirical studies.  
The first proposition builds on the difference between IR and HR, which helps to 
understand the pattern of transfer (Farndale et al. 2008; Parry et al. 2008). Employers, 
in particular in coordinated market economies, are usually expected to comply with 
local IR practices (not so much with HR practices such as recruitment or training). 
Unlike HR practices, IR practices are easily observed outside the firm, and the public 
is more interested in IR than in HR practices because the moral economy is often 
entrenched in the labour movement and the larger society (Schmitt/Sadowski 2003). 
Hence, both formal regulations and cultural expectations induce MNEs to comply in 
host countries that are coordinated market economies with local IR practices but not 
necessarily with HR practices. Hence, MNEs usually do not transfer their (usually 
more liberal) IR practices to coordinated market economies, while MNEs with head-
quarters in coordinated market economies refrain from transferring constrictive IR 
practices to liberal market economies. The institutional pressures on HR practices, on 
the other hand, are much weaker. Overall, as a first proposition we suggest that a transfer of 
HR practices is more frequent than the transfer of IR practices.  
A second proposition refers to the different national employment systems. If 
home and host country are of the same type of capitalism, a transfer of practices is 
likely to be smooth since the underlying national employment systems are similar. 
However, the management of MNEs may not be interested in a practice transfer to a 
host country with a very similar employment system. In line with this idea, it has been 
shown that US MNEs tend to impose more centralized decisions on HR the more 
closely the host country resemble the coordinated market economy model, that is, the 
more distant the host country is to the US institutional environment (Fenton-
O'Creevy et al. 2008).  
Conversely, if institutional distance is large (both countries differ in their type of 
capitalism), the transfer of practices may become more difficult and at the same time 
more strategically important for the MNE. It becomes more difficult because of insti-
tutional pressures to adapt. It becomes more strategically important because an 
MNE’s employment practices starkly differ from local practice in the host country, 
and adapting to this would imply a substantial deviation from the parent company’s 
practices. This, in turn, may endanger the benefits of global integration of policies. 
Therefore, despite the obstacles to a transfer, MNEs very likely seek to transfer em-
ployment practices across differing types of capitalism.  
The main content and direction of transfer is also predictable. The dominance ef-
fect or Anglo-Saxonization of practices implies that a transfer from liberal home to 
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coordinated host economies is more likely than the opposite. Furthermore, because of 
the differences in terms of societal norms, transfer is likely to concentrate on HR 
practices, while in IR practices local adaptation is likely to prevail. As a second proposi-
tion, then, it is argued that observed transfer will primarily be in HR practices from liberal to coordi-
nated market economies. 
A final proposition is derived from the Anglo-Saxonization hypothesis 
(Ferner/Quintanilla 1998). When certain norms exist in the global business communi-
ty to adopt US employment practices, then this may lead the management of MNEs 
to adopt these practices, irrespective of the variety of capitalism in the home and host 
country. US type of practices such as performance-related pay or performance man-
agement may become common currency within MNEs. These norms may clash with 
the societal norms attached to certain IR practices. Therefore, the effect of Anglo-
Saxonization will be visible in HR rather than IR practices. As a third proposition, then, it 
is expected that some “Anglo-Saxon” HR practices (but not practices from other countries) are intro-
duced irrespective of the type of capitalism in home and host country.  
3. Empirical review 
3.1 Procedures for sampling and analysis 
Rosenzweig/Nohria (1994) marks the beginning of a stream of recent contributions 
studying the transfer of practices within MNEs. Studies published subsequently in the 
English language in scholarly journals were identified. The analysis was restricted to 
journal articles because of the quality control in the reviewing process. This restriction 
is common in other areas of research (for example, Wall/Wood 2005). Hence, book 
chapters were not considered. Also excluded from the analysis were a number of 
closely related articles. These do not focus on MNEs in particular (Gooderham et al. 
1999) or do not provide any incidence on the actual transfer of practices (Cadin et al. 
2006). We also dropped from the analysis four studies that did not allow to differenti-
ate between liberal and coordinated market economies (Beck et al. 2009; Björkman et 
al. 2007; Myloni et al. 2004; Ngo et al. 1998). 
Overall, we identified 34 articles published from 1994 to 2009. Of these, 14 fol-
lowed a quantitative empirical methodology, that is, the findings were based on regres-
sion or variance analyses of a large number of observations. We considered the study 
as the unit of analysis, which implies that each study contributes equally to the overall 
result (Cooper 1998). Hence, studies which follow a qualitative, case-based design 
were not included in this review, because they would have had a disproportionately 
high impact on synthesis results. However, the case-based methodology has unique 
strengths that will be taken up in the concluding section of this paper. The studies we 
found were published from 1994 to 2009. The data mostly refer to the period 1996 to 
2000. The studies all had a cross-section design, and in nine of the 14 studies the sam-
ple size exceeded 100. 
The 14 studies covered 12 countries, five of which are liberal market economies 
(Australia, Britain, Canada, the Republic of Ireland and the USA) and five of which 
are coordinated market economies (Denmark/Norway, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, 
and Sweden). Two countries, France and South Korea, are more controversial. They 
were counted as coordinated market economies for the purpose of the review because 
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empirical analyses show that the institutional setting resembles those of coordinated 
market economies (Schneider/Paunescu 2012). 
We analyzed for each study whether a transfer occurred or not, whether HR prac-
tices, IR practices, or both were examined, and which home and host countries were 
involved. For example, Tüselmann et al. (2002) found that UK-based subsidiaries 
differed significantly from local UK companies in terms of their IR practices. Hence, 
we inferred that a transfer of IR practices from Germany (a coordinated market home 
country) to the UK (a liberal market host country) had occurred. Straightforward as 
this appears, it was sometimes difficult to establish the information because transfer 
was measured in manifold ways in these studies. Usually, the studies contained infor-
mation on how widespread a certain practice was (as in the presence of unions or 
works council) or how intensive it was used on average (as in training expenditures). 
Depending on the study design, various comparisons have been drawn to gain infor-
mation on transfer versus local adaptation. In one study, the comparison referred to 
differences in means between local companies and parent companies 
(Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994). In other studies, the comparison was made between local 
companies and subsidiaries of MNEs (Farndale et al. 2008; Geary/Roche 2001; 
Myloni et al. 2004; Ngo et al. 1998; Turner et al. 1997; Tüselmann et al. 2002), in still 
others between subsidiaries and headquarters (Björkman et al. 2007; Pudelko/Harzing 
2007). Finally, in some studies differences between companies in various host coun-
tries have been identified and it was then distinguished between local companies and 
subsidiaries by including interaction dummies (Bae et al. 1998; Gooderham et al. 1998; 
Poutsma et al. 2005; Poutsma et al. 2006). From all these ways of measurement we 
inferred whether a transfer or local adaptation prevailed. One situation led to ambigu-
ous cases, namely the interpretation of similarities between local companies in liberal 
market economies and subsidiaries of MNEs with headquarters in another liberal 
market economy. If both groups showed similar practices, we interpreted this situa-
tion as a transfer. Though that situation might also be interpreted as local adaptation, 
an alternative classification would not affect the conclusions concerning our three 
propositions. 
3.2 Findings 
A detailed summary of the findings is provided in Table 1. Furthermore, the Figures 1 
to 4 illustrate, via a graphical method of social network analysis, the web of countries 
for which a transfer has been analyzed (Figures 1 and 3) and for which a transfer has 
been confirmed in the analysis (Figures 2 and 4). 
Various interesting findings emerge from the analysis. The first proposition, stat-
ing that the transfer of HR practices is more frequent than that of IR practices, is 
supported. Of the links between countries in terms of HR transfer, most are con-
firmed (compare Figure 1 to Figure 2). Conversely, of the links between countries of 
IR transfer most are not confirmed (compare Figure 3 to Figure 4). Apparently, com-
panies have some leeway in transferring HR practices whereas to IR practices strong 
societal norms attach, norms exerting a strong pressure on companies to adapt to local 
practices. 
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Table 1: Summary of findings from quantitative studies on the transfer of HR and IR 
practices (1994 to 2009) 
 Host 
Home 
 LME  CME 
LME 
US to UK transfer of HR practices 
(Gooderham et al. 1998;  
Faulkner et al. 2002; Poutsma  
et al. 2005; Gooderham et al. 
2006; Poutsma et al. 2006) 
transfer of IR practices  
(Parry et al. 2008) 
decentralized control of HR 
practices  
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008) 
US 
to 
Ger-
many 
transfer of HR practices  
(Poutsma et al. 2005; Poutsma et al. 
2006; Pudelko/Harzing 2007) 
no transfer of HR practices  
(Gooderham et al. 2006) 
no transfer of IR practices  
(Parry et al. 2008) 
 
Ire-
land 
transfer of HR practices (Turner 
et al. 1997; Gooderham et al. 
1998; Geary/Roche 2001; 
Gooderham et al. 2006; 
Poutsma et al. 2006) 
no transfer of IR practices 
(Turner et al. 1997; 
Geary/Roche 2001) 
decentralized control of HR 
practices  
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008) 
Norway/ 
Den-
mark 
transfer of HR practices (Gooderham et al. 
1998; Gooderham et al. 2006) 
no transfer of IR practices  
(Parry et al. 2008) 
centralized control of HR practices  
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008) 
Sweden transfer of HR practices ( 
Poutsma et al. 2006) 
no transfer of IR practices  
(Parry et al. 2008) 
centralized control of HR practices  
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008) 
Nether-
lands 
transfer of HR practices  
(Poutsma et al. 2006) 
no transfer of IR practices  
(Parry et al. 2008) 
centralized control of HR practices  
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008) 
Aust-
ralia 
transfer or adaptation of  
HR practices  
(Gooderham et al. 2006) 
transfer of IR practices  
(Parry et al. 2008) 
decentralized control of HR 
practices  
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008) 
others ambiguous  
(Pudelko/Harzing 2007: Japan) 
transfer of HR practices  
(Bae et al. 1998: South Korea) 
centralized control of HR practices  
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008: Switzer-
land, Austria, Finland, Portugal, Italy, 
Spain, Belgium) 
UK to US transfer of or adaptation to  
HR practices 
(Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994) 
 
Can-
ada 
to 
US no or weak transfer 
(Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994; 
Pudelko/Harzing 2007) 
 
UK no transfer of HR practices 
(Faulkner et al. 2002) 
transfer of IR practices 
(Farndale et al. 2008;  
Parry et al. 2008) 
Aust-
ralia 
transfer of IR practices  
(Parry et al. 2008) 
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Table 1: Summary of findings from quantitative studies on the transfer of HR and IR 
practices (1994 to 2009) (continued) 
 Host 
Home  LME  CME 
        
CME 
Ger-
many 
to 
US no transfer of HR practices 
(Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994; 
Pudelko/Harzing 2007) 
Ger-
many 
to  
Japan no transfer but anglo-saxonization 
(Pudelko/Harzing 2007) 
UK transfer of HR practices  
(Faulkner et al. 2002) 
transfer of IR practices 
(Tüselmann et al. 2002) 
Ja-
pan 
to 
 
US transfer of several HR practices 
(Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994) 
Ja-
pan 
to 
Germa-
ny 
no transfer but anglo-saxonization 
(Pudelko/Harzing 2007) 
UK not identifiable  
(Farndale et al. 2008) 
South 
Korea 
transfer of HR practices  
(Bae et al. 1998) 
Nether-
lands 
to 
US no transfer of HR practices 
(Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994) 
 
UK not identifiable  
(Farndale et al. 2008) 
Swe-
den 
to 
US no transfer (except for training 
(Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994) 
UK transfer of HR practices  
(Faulkner et al. 2002) 
Fran-
ce to 
US no transfer except for training 
(Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994) 
 
A number of empirical observations are consistent with the second proposition, ac-
cording to which transfer will be most frequent in HR practices from liberal market 
home to coordinated market host countries. Firstly, the societal norms appear to be 
stronger in coordinated market economies. In none of the studies has a transfer of IR 
practices to a coordinated market economy been documented; a transfer solely occurs 
among liberal market economies, namely the USA, Britain, Canada, and Australia 
(Figure 4). In that respect, the study by Parry et al. (2008) is particularly interesting 
because they included HR and IR practices in various countries. They found that IR 
practices are transferred from US and Canadian headquarters to Britain and Australia 
but not from US and Canadian headquarters to Germany, Norway/Denmark, Swe-
den, and the Netherlands.  
Secondly, even in liberal market economies, IR practices are difficult to change if 
they are strong. Ireland is a good case in point. In two studies, the transfer of practices 
from the main investor country for Ireland – the USA – has been examined 
(Geary/Roche 2001; Turner et al. 1997). In both studies, HR practices are found to 
travel well to the local subsidiaries. In IR practices, by contrast, US investors choose 
to comply with collective bargaining institutions, which in Ireland are developed more 
strongly than in other liberal market economies. 
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Thirdly, we observe the expected asymmetry in the transfer of HR practices 
between different types of capitalism. Transfer is more frequent from a liberal market 
home country to a coordinated market host country than in the opposite direction. Six 
links of a transfer of HR practices from a liberal to a coordinated market economy 
have been studied; for all six a transfer was confirmed. Of the equivalent six links of a 
transfer of HR practices from a coordinated to a liberal market economy, only three 
cases of a transfer were confirmed. These involved a transfer of HR practices of 
Japanese and German MNEs to the USA (Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994), and a transfer 
of German MNEs to the UK (Faulkner et al. 2002).  
Finally, there is an interesting finding that is consistent with the third proposition, 
the Anglo-Saxonization hypothesis. In a study including German MNEs with subsidi-
aries in Japan, and Japanese MNEs with subsidiaries in Germany, no transfer was 
found on average but, rather, an introduction in both direction of practices that are 
considered part of the US business model (Pudelko/Harzing 2007). This is consistent 
with the dominance effect. 
 
Figure 1: Studies analyzing the transfer of HR practices  
 
 
Note: The lines indicate that a transfer of HR practices from country A to country B has been analyzed. The line thickness 
indicates the number of studies. Circles denote coordinated market economies, the squares denote liberal market economies. 
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Figure 2: Studies confirming the transfer of HR practices  
 
 
Note: The lines indicate that a transfer of HR practices from country A to country B has been confirmed in the analysis. The 
line thickness indicates the number of studies. Circles denote coordinated market economies, the squares denote liberal 
market economies. 
 
Figure 3: Studies analyzing the transfer of IR practices  
 
 
Note: The lines indicate that a transfer of IR practices from country A to country B has been analyzed. The line thickness 
indicates the number of studies. Circles denote coordinated market economies, the squares denote liberal market economies. 
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Figure 4: Studies confirming the transfer of IR practices  
 
 
Note: The lines indicate that a transfer of IR practices from country A to country B has been confirmed in the analysis. The line 
thickness indicates the number of studies. Circles denote coordinated market economies, the squares denote liberal market 
economies. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Revisiting 14 empirical studies on the transfer of employment practices among afflu-
ent societies we show that national employment systems are susceptible to change via 
MNEs – but to varying degrees. HR practices are more frequently transferred than IR 
practices. HR practices are more often transferred from a liberal market economy to a 
coordinated market economy than vice versa. Some adoption of HR practices com-
mon in the USA points to a dominance effect. As this implies, national employment 
systems are unevenly affected by the activities of MNEs. Coordinated market econo-
mies more than liberal market economies are under pressure because MNEs are likely 
to insert a good deal of “foreignness” into their national employment system. HR 
practices more than IR practices will be transferred within MNEs and will therefore 
change the employment systems of host countries. The societal norms that underpin 
certain IR regulations and practices render IR practices more nationally stable than 
HR practices. 
The empirical studies we have revisited had certain limitations that inhibit definite 
conclusions on the extent of change in national business systems. Firstly, the studies 
were cross-sectional and did not allow inferences on change as such. Secondly, the 
studies concentrated on a small number of economies. The countries most heavily 
studied were the USA, Britain, and Germany as home and as host countries. Im-
portant liberal and coordinated market economies such as Switzerland, Austria, or 
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New Zealand were not studied or only studied with reference to whether a centraliza-
tion of employment decisions was pursued (Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2008). (Of course, 
we have omitted countries that should not be considered as either liberal or coordi-
nated market economies; that may be considered another limitation of our review.) 
Thirdly, though we discussed findings from 14 studies, these are not truly independ-
ent. Seven of the studies used data from the international Cranet network (Farndale et 
al. 2008; Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2008; Gooderham et al. 2006; Gooderham et al. 1998; 
Poutsma et al. 2006; Turner et al. 1997). Fourthly, the transfer of practices was meas-
ured in different ways. This inhibits more systematic reviews. Overall, the scope for 
generalizing from examining these quantitative studies is somewhat restricted. None-
theless, the clear pattern that emerged shows that the approach of distinguishing prac-
tices – HR versus IR – and economies – liberal versus coordinated – is fruitful in pre-
dicting an uneven transfer of practices. 
There are five routes for future research that we find particularly promising. First-
ly, a similar analysis of qualitative studies may shed light on issues that quantitative 
studies cannot illuminate. For example, qualitative studies have looked at “reverse 
transfer”, in which practices travel from a subsidiary to headquarters (Edwards 1998; 
Edwards et al. 2005; Zhang/Edwards 2007). Similarly, qualitative studies may distin-
guish between transfer and an attempt to centralize, for example by introducing best 
practices (Zhang/Edwards 2007). Centralization and reverse transfer may have impli-
cations for change in national systems that differ from those of a transfer from home 
to host country. 
Secondly, change in institutions and business systems should be studied more di-
rectly by looking at a number of countries over time. One reason is that transfer may 
not only cause change, but change may itself encourage the transfer of practices. In 
particular, a strong degree of institutional change may give MNEs more leeway in 
transferring practices even to coordinated market economies whose collective institu-
tions are often hostile to transfer. This is because the normative pressure of institu-
tions becomes weaker if traditional institutions are undergoing a transformation. A 
good example is Ireland. Geary/Roche (2001) found that US MNEs that entered Ire-
land later than 1985 transferred employment practices to Irish subsidiaries rather than 
adapting to local practices. The reason is that, by the 1990s, the institutions were 
somewhat weakened in response to strong foreign direct investment. Similar points 
can be made for Greece (Myloni et al. 2004) and Sweden (Poutsma et al. 2006). 
A third route concerns institutional distance between economies. Future studies 
should work towards measures that are more fine-grained than the dichotomy be-
tween liberal and coordinated market economies that we used. For example, an overall 
index measure of institutions and of institutional distance may be invoked (Brookes et 
al. 2011) The indices could include measures such as the strictness of employment 
protection, collective bargaining coverage, the length of employment contracts, and 
the number of people in vocational training. More itemized analyses of institutional 
distance may allow for more specific predictions as to which practices in national em-
ployment systems may be most prone to change.  
Fourthly, in futures studies the channels through which national employment sys-
tems change due to the influence of MNEs could be uncovered. In this paper, coer-
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cive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism were employed as arguments to help de-
rive hypotheses. Untangling the relative existence and importance of the different 
processes may shed further light on differences between different types of capitalism. 
Here, qualitative studies may be more instructive than quantitative studies. 
Finally, it might be studied how the transfer of practices is affected by type of in-
dustry or sector. It has been argued, and shown empirically, that the liberal and the 
coordinated market economy models each have their particular sector-specific com-
parative advantages, with liberal market economies supporting more radical innova-
tion and high-tech, and coordinated market economies supporting incremental inno-
vation and medium high tech (Schneider/Paunescu 2012). These comparative ad-
vantages suggest that the extent of transfer may also differ by whether a certain prac-
tice is compatible with radical or incremental innovation, suggesting complex interac-
tions in the extent of transfer between industry and type of capitalism. 
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